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THB INFLUENCE OF WEAPONS ON NEW MEXICO HISTORY

F. S. Curtis, Jr.
Of the many factors which have brought about the
events we call history, the influence of weapons has perhaps received the least attention. The history of New
Mexico, as it happens, furnishes rather an interesting picture of both the development of weapons and certain very
curious phases of the effect of that development upon
human events.
The original inhabitants of New Mexico, of course,
present a complete and perfect example of the weapons of
prehistoric man, and here, longer than anywhere else, these
primitive weapons continue to exist and be used in constant
association with the latest products of the armorer's invention. The pre-Spanish period, moreover, presents an
interesting historical problem which can be given, in the
present state of our knowledge, nothing better than a hypothetical solution, but for which the factor of weapons can
offer an interesting and reasonably probable hypothesis.
The problem itself is simple: if, as certain archaeologists assert, the Pueblo civilization was declining at the
Spanish Conquest, what was the cause of the decline? There
is little evidence of loss of energy or population through
epidemics. The migrations of which we know were merely
from one site to another within the Pueblo area. Religion
made no demands for human sacrifice. Agriculture does
not seem to have suffered any really formidable calamities,
so that continued famine would not seem to be the cause.
The architecture and arrangement of the towns seems to
have been most appropriate for the defensive tactics which
had for centuries protected the Pueblos from their marauding enemies. What, then, is a reasonable solution? The
one which occurs most readily to a student of the mechani-
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cal side of history is that one or more of the hostile tribes
had developed a bow of greater range and accuracy than
that of the Pueblos, and were thus enabled to overwhelm
the weaker towns and to reduce the man-power of the
stronger ones to a point where the production of food and
the maintenance of security occupied so much of the population that there was not time for cultural development
or even the preservation of the culture of former times.
The most obvious instance of the effect of weapons on
the history of the state is, naturally, the Spanish Conquest.
In the period between 1540 and 1599 we see small bodies
of Spaniards roaming at will over the entire Southwest,
and finally assuming mastery of an enormous empire, all
in the face of an incredibly disproportionate native population, whose love of liberty and whose courage in battle
were inferior to those of no race on earth. Superiority of
"'eapons, and that alone, made such exploits a possibility.
It was the Stone Age against the Age of Metal and of Gunpowder, and the Stone Age had no recourse but submission
or flight. Against stone-tipped arrows and lances, obsidian
daggers, stone-headed clubs, and the propelling force of
the human arm alone, the Spaniards opposed steel-tipped
arrows and lances, steel swords and daggers, and the propelling force of gunpowder. Against the buffalo-hide
shield the Spaniard could match complete armor of steel,
and the defensive powers of the two are comparable only
in ridicule. It is true, of course, that the Spanish armor
could be pierced at sufficiently short range - Villagra's account of the death of Juan Zaldivar assures us of that muchand it is also true that it could be crushed if the wearer
ventured to points where great rocks could be dropped upon him, but for every Spaniard so wounded, there were
five hundred Indians struck down for lack of adequate defense against the Spanish weapons. It is also true that
the Spanish fire-arms - wheellocks or matchlocks, as they
were - were uncertain of operation, fearfully inaccurate,
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and capable of no more than one or two shots per minute,
while such cannon as were capable of transportation were
of small size and little real use, but against such weapons
as the Indians had they were enough, and the fact was only
too clear to the Indians, so that in all the period of conquest
we find but four important battles recorded. The first
two of these, Coronado's battles at Zuni and Tiguex, were
sufficient proof of Spanish prowess to subdue all opposition
for more than fifty years. The third, the first of the fights
at Acoma, was an Indian triumph, but due far more to
Spanish carelessness and mismanagement than to any other
factor. The hopes it had raised, however, were quickly
crushed in the terrific three-day battle in which Vicente
Zaldivar, with no more than eighty men, not only avenged
his brother, and restored the prestige of Spain, but reduced
the population of Acoma to a bare six hundred, and from
that time onward for eighty-three years the Pueblo Indian
ren~ained at peace.
Courage he had, in abundance - the
fight at Acoma was one of the most furious and most gallant of the whole history of America - but courage against
superior machinery of war is of little use, and the Pueblo
Indian was wise enough to face the fact.
The nomadic Indians, on the other hand, furnished a
problem which the Spaniard never solved in full, and one
which took the American many years of the very most
strenuous effort to settle permanently. Faced with the
problem of surrenderor flight, he chose flight, for unlike
the Pueblo, he had nothing to lose, no home to defend, and
not even the desire for a fixed place of residence. War
was his industry and his diversion, and the Spaniard meant
no more than a new enemy who had to be dealt with more
cautiously than the old. To the Spaniard this type of enemy
was a really serious problem. To subdue him was impossible, for the heavily-armed Spaniard could not, either
afoot or on horseback, come to grips with an enemy who
would not wait for him, and who could escape him nine
times out of ten, because of superior speed. To settle over
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wide areas in the face of such an enemy was equally impossible, for his sudden raids, delivered without the slightest warning and always against the least protected,. gave
no chance for defense or for battle. The only solution, and
that which the Spanish adopted, was much the same as the
Pueblos had chosen centuries before, the concentration of
population around a few strong and well-defended towns
where the superiority of their weapons could be used for
defense at least. Here, then, we find the reason why New
Mexico remained so long a region of towns instead of farms,
a region where the gap between rich and poor was so wide,
where peonage and illiteracy flourished, and where feudalism outlived its time because the necessity which created
feudalism in Europe was still alive in America.
A further (and a very wise) measure of the Spanish
government was a law, couched in stringent terms, and
carried out with the utmost care, forbidding the sale of
weapons to the Indians. That this law was really effective
~ay be seen from two instances where it did not apply,
one the massacre at Tome by Comanches who had secured
firearms, the other, the terrible defeat of Don Pedro de
Villasur in the battle on the Platte River in 1719, where
the opposing forces - Indians and a few Frenchmen - were
fully equipped wih firearms, and from which only six men
returned, a force representing over half the garrison of
Santa Fe having been left dead on the field of battle.
The Pueblo Revolution is a further and an impressive
exhibit in the case of the wel:lpon in history for several
reasons. The last great effort of the Pueblo Indian aga;nst
the domination of the Spaniard, there can be little dciubt
that a large part of the determination to revolt came from
the gradual acquisition, piece by piece, of such small store
of weapons as gave ground for the feeling that the advantage held by the Spaniard was at least reduced to the point
where a favorable outcome could reasonably be expected.
The early results, moreover, were quite in accordance with
first expectations, and the hearts of the Pueblos, as well as

328

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

their hands, must have been greatly strengthened by the
first tide of success, which had overwhelmed every settlement in New Mexico except Ysleta and Santa Fe as well
as placing in the hands of the Indians a supply of nearly
three hundred hackbusses, not to mention swords, lances,
arid other steel weapons. That the Spaniard should have
been so stricken is due to no fault of the weapons they possessed, but rather to that wise planning of the Indians
which gave no opportunity for resistance. No time was
given for the Spaniards to arm; no chance offered for one
town to assist another - save for the expedition of Garcia
from Ysleta to Jemez - and only the strong points of Santa
Fe and Ysleta witl}stood the storm.
That these two should have been able to survive the
first shock, and later to remove to a place of safety through
a country swarming with the enemy, is due partly to their
weapons and partly to the reputation which the Spaniard,
armed and prepared for battle, had made in the past. At
the Siege of Santa Fe Governor Otermfn with a bare 155
men fit for service (and of these, to quote his ow'n records,
"only thirty-six having complete armor, and the most part
afoot, and with bad or broken hackbusses, and without even
leathern jackets for their protection"), defended a total
population of 2500 souls against the attack of more than
three thousand fighting men, the figures themselves giving
a clear picture of the great weight that armament cast into the Spanish side of the scale.
Between the Revolution and the Reconquest we find
an interesting division of mind taking place among the
victorious Indians. With some the victories of the Revolution seem to have had such influence that they felt themselves invincible. Others, however, saw most clearly the
failure to destroy the Spaniards under Otermfn and Garcia,
and realized that armed opposition to the Spaniards in
arms was as hopeless as ever. Those of the first opinion,
regardless of their shortage of ammunition and lack of
skill with the arms they had acquired, remained in their
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towns before the expedition of Otermin and Cruzate, and
the result was exactly what might have been expected.
Otermin took Ysleta and Cruzate took Zia, each with little
loss, but with terrible slaughter of the enemy. For either
governor to proceed further in the work of Reconquest,
however, was impossible because of a number of factors of
which not the least was the course followed by those wiser
Pueblos, who, realizing the futility of open combat, borrowed the tactics of their enemies of the Apacheria, left
their towns for the recesses of the mountains, and harrassed the Spaniards by sudden raids upon small foraging
parties, by stampeding their horse-herds, and by a thousand other stratagems each insignificant in itself, but helping to swell a total that barred out the Spaniards as effectively as an actual defeat.
The inherent nature of the Pueblo, however, coupled
with his native enemies, soon brought matters back to their
former status. As a roving nomad, even though his roving
was confined within very small limits, the Pueblo was not
a success, for he was neither able to make himself comfortable, nor to repel the attacks of the truly nomadic tribes,
without the assistance of his adobe village; and it was but
a short time before he returned to his accustomed dwelling,
prepared, for the most part, to submit peaceably when the
Spaniard returned, exchanging a precarious liberty for a
certain safety and relative comfort. At the coming of De
Vargas some few made one last effort at resistance, but
Santa Fe and the pueblo on the Potrero Viejo were soon
taken, with the usual terrific losses on the part of the Indians, and only the kindliness of De Vargas - perhaps supplemented by a shortage of ammunition - saved the refugees on the Mesa of San Ildefonso from a similar fate.
So, then, the Reconquest ended, and the problem of Spanish
settlement had been finally solved, with superiority of
weapons aiding in no small degree to the solution.
The problem of expansion in the face of roving tribes
was, as already stated, one which the Spaniards never en-
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tirely settled, and in the hundred and fifty-odd years between the Reconquest and the Civil War the failure to
settle it kept New Mexico in virtually a feudal state of
civilization, the feudal parallel being carried to its fullest
extent by the great land-grants made to men and families
whose reputation as Indian fighters stood highest.
In this same area at least two great occasions arose
on which superiority of weapons might have played a great
part, but in both cases a recourse to arms was avoided by
purely diplomatic means, one instance being the TexasSanta Fe Expedition, in which the astute conduct of Governor Armijo avoided a clash where Texas rifles might have
altered N ~w Mexico history to a remarkable extent, and
the other the capture of New Mexico by General Kearney,
in which the same Armijo was - well, persuaded - that resistance to the well-armed troops of the United States was
profitless. A view in miniature of what might have happened on the two occasions is offered by a number of minor
incidents in which the rifle contended aginst the smoothbore, and among these Lobato's defeat at the hands of
"Snively's Avengers" and the fight at Turley's Mill during
the Taos Rebellion are worthy of mention. Lobato's battle
was of short duration, but of some effect, his small force,
though nearly equal to Snively's, being gobbled up with
such celerity that General Armijo, who had intended to destroy Snively with the main body of his troops, suddenly
decided that Santa Fe was a far better military position
than the one he then occupied, and translated his decision
into action with commendable promptness. In the Turley's
Mill fight eight men armed with rifles and well supplied
with ammunition held out for two days and a night against
a force of rebels amounting to well over five hundred, and
at the end of that period, their ammunition being exhausted, three of the eight fought their way out.
The Taos Rebellion as a whole furnishes further proof,
if such is needed, of the wisdom of Armij 0 in refusing to
meet the forces of Kearney, and illustrates the ability of
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the American forces to compel submission through superiority of armament. In the three battles of La Canada de
Santa Cruz, Embudo, and the Pueblo de Taos the enemy
invariably occupied a superior position, and probably outnumbered the Americans actually engaged yet. in all the
enemy was defeated completely and remarkably quickly,
since the actual time consumed by all three seems to have
been very little more than four hours, most of which was
consumed at the battle at the Pueblo.
By no means to be forgotten is the fact that the commerce of the Santa Fe Trail, which not only aided greatly
in the financial support of the state at a time when such
support was a vital necessity, but also called the attention
of the United States most strongly to the Southwest, was
maintained and made possible by the rifle. Here was the
beginnIng of the solution of the problem of the roving Indian, for despite his invariable willingness to try to capture
some part of the immense wealth that rolled across the
plains under his very nose, the rifles of the waggoners
and their escort rendered his efforts useless in all but a
minimum of cases, and these cases in which the number
of travellers - and consequently the booty obtained - was
so small as to make the cost quite disproportionate to the
returns.
Except for questions of mere probability the Civil War
in New Mexico offers little from the viewpoint of this
paper. That the Southern forces operating in New Mexico
must have been better armed than the majority of the Confederate Army we know, because the surrender of General
Twiggs in Texas, and the capture of Forts Fillmore and
Stanton, of Major Isaac Lynde's command, and of the Depot
at Albuquerque necessarily placed in their hands large
quantities of the small arms and artillery of the Regular
Army, so that the troops under Canby, including the New
Mexico Militia, could have had very little superiority in
regard to weapons, if, indeed, they possessed any. The
Colorado Volunteers, however, may well have had some of
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the newer type of rifle which the Federal Government had
adopted in '61 and '62, as they were equipped at Fort Union,
a point in relatively direct communication with the centers
of manufacture, and one which the government was making every effort to supply in expectation of an impending
attack. Further plausibility is gained for such an idea
from the fact that when the Colorado troops met Sibley's
forces in the battles near Apache Cafton the triumphant
advance of the Confederates not only met its first serious
check, but was turned back into a retreat that very soon
took on the aspects of a rout, ending all possibility of a
conquest of New Mexico by the Confederacy
Another question, however, immediately took the place
of this one, and continued to occupy the energies of both
State and Federal governments for nearly twenty-five
years of practically continuous effort. Even before the
defeat of Sibley the concentration of Federal troops had
left many outlying points undefended, and the hostile tribes
had been quick to take advantage of the situation. After
the menace of the Confederate invasion had been removed
the National forces in New Mexico were reduced to a minimum, and the hostiles became even bolder, with the result
that the New Mexico troops and such units as the War Department had left in the state were almost constantly occupied by punitive expeditions to all points of the compass.
Nor did the surrender at Appomatox mean peace for New
Mexico, for though the end of the Civil War enabled the
government to send aid with a liberal hand, and though that
aid was continued until the necessity was over and was sent
at an expenditure that seems incredible, the fighting continued sporadically until the very threshold of the 20th
century. The causes for so prolonged a struggle are naturally many and varied, among them the isolation of the field
of action, the extreme difficulty of the terrain, and the
extraordinary military abilities of the enemy (the Apaches
in particular having proved themselves perhaps the most
efficient body of fighters the world has ever seen) but the
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factor which most concerns us at present is that of firearms, and in this particular situation the firearms factor
functioned largely as both a cause and a solution.
In the years following the American occupation the
hostile tribes first began to get a supply of modern weapons,
and from that time until the end this supply was constantly on the increase. The Government itself, at various
times, issued guns to Indians on Reservations, troubling
itself very little over the fact that the Reservation Indian
of today was only too likely to be the hostile of tomorrow,
and that the possession of a practical firearm was of itself
a strong temptation to the warpath. The gun-runner flourished like the 2"reen bay-tree, and both his mode of life and
his occasional death at the hands of his customers were regarded as uproariously funny by the average settler. That
the arms furnished the Indians, whether by Government
or gun-runner, were obsolete is quite true; the Indian got
most of his really good weapons by capture; but after two
hundred and fifty-odd years of fighting the white man and
studying the tactics best adapted for his ruin the Indian did
not need any advantage in weapons to make trouble. An.,
gun that would go off with reasonable regularity was quite
sufficient for Indian purposes, and was more than good
enough from the point of view of settler and soldier.
With the Indian possessed of modern arms, then, in
addition to his other military equipment, the white man
was really hard pressed, and for his defense he called upon every resource he could use, both military and mechanical. Of the military men we hear much. The names of
Carson, Chavez, Crook, Howard, Eugene A; Carr, and a
dozen others, are familiar to every student of the Indian
Wars, and almost everyone has some idea as to the identity
of the men named. The inventors, however, are far different. The Kawkens, Christian Sharp, Tyler Henry, Winchester, Hotchkiss, Colt, Remington, Spencer and Lee some few of these names, perhaps, suggest great corporations and the making of money, none the making of history, yet had it not been for the inventive genius of these
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men and many more in the making of ever better weapons
of ever greater range, accuracy and rapidity of fire, our
state might still be struggling to attain domestic peace and
security with the goal not yet in sight. The hours spent
in the workshop by a few men have shortened a hundred
for one the hours spent on the battlefield by thousands of
their fellow-citizens, and throughout the whole of New
Mexico's history there has been standing, far off in the
background, unseen and unheeded, the grimy figure of a
man with the clever fingers of the mechanic and the dreamy
eyes of the inventor, watching that history work out its
course, its tools the weapons he has fashioned.

